This article is from WeChat public account: new financial Luo Shu (ID: FintechBook) , author: Ray slow, title figure from: vision China
After 12 years on the line, China’s first P2P platform patted the industry and fled the industry. Renamed “Xinyi Technology”. A month ago, it no longer released new targets for individual investors, all of which came from institutions. 4 days ago, Zhang Jun, the founder of the auction, said:
“We have no longer had anything to do with P2P.”
This symbolic platform, 12 years of pure-line model of idealism, until the looming high-pressure, glimpse of a profitable loan-making business, voted with the feet, fleeing the death trap of P2P .
I don’t know how to die, I know how to live.
Most P2P in China has died in credit intermediaries. When the 2014 tide began, they learned that Ma Yun shouted and called for the life of the bank. In fact, P2P does not have the bank’s life, but it has committed the bank’s disease. Most of the platforms have set up a pool of funds, sifting through storage, learning to invest, and earning spreads.
For 12 years, P2P is behind the bank, next to the originalUnder the business model of the risk control of banking financial institutions, under the business model of credit and rigid payment, P2P has insufficient risk control, and the credit is missing, and the risk is seriously tilted toward the debt side.
This business model of light assets P2P, almost no cash flow and capital to optimize costs, usually only the annual transaction size of more than 1 billion, in order to cover costs, which is the general P2P break-even line.
The matter of credit intermediation, how can P2P of light assets be done? Therefore, the debt side is expanding, the quality assets are insufficient, the risk control is insufficient, and the credit information is insufficient, which leads to the accumulation of risks and the enlargement of the exposure. Need, the break-even line has been rising all the way, the scale can only rise, can not drop, 2 billion yuan, 3 billion yuan … until they can not reach.
In 2017, the regulator pulled down the “double down” sickle and the tide began.
P2P wakes up like a dream and seeks to get rid of it. However, most of the platforms, due to the break of the bad debt risk exposure, have broken the capital chain. Since the “double down” in August 2017, more than 1,800 platforms have been killed in more than two years.
To get out of the way or to transform, only sufficient cash flow is enough to get out of trouble.
Paging loans have been earning cash flow through the loan-raising business in the past few years, and even if it is a credit intermediary and rigid, it is enough to maintain the continuous redemption process. The current bad debts of more than 800 million yuan are lent on the platform of any rigid redemption. If there is not enough cash flow, it is difficult to retreat.
Transformation to help lend, has become a life-saving straw to get rid of P2P.
After the rise of consumer credit, other P2P assets may shrink or die. The borrowers of P2P credits overlap with the customer groups of loan-assisted and licensed consumer finance. At this time, P2P’s profit model for loan-to-debt is almost unbearable. Instead of doing P2P, it is responsible for hundreds of thousands of investors’ principals, earning hard service fees, and giving investment return costs of 5-10 percentage points higher than bank funds. It is better to make a loan, and to make a profit.
Looking at the financial report of the loan-sending platform, you know that it’s not lost.
In the financial reports of the financial technology companies in the first two quarters of 2019, the net profit data of loan-to-lending loans was attractive. The credited Q2 revenue of credit and P2P-based business was 1,562.3 billion yuan, and the net profit was 660.5 million yuan. 360 Financial Q1 CampIt received 2.009 billion yuan and net profit of 712 million yuan. The Q2 revenue of the fun store group was 2.22 billion yuan and the net profit was 1.16 billion yuan.
When the P2P was first used, the borrowers who could not bear the weight of the platform, when doing loan assistance, must become an indispensable amaranth in life.
Helping loans also has the difficulty of helping with loans.
In China, the systemic crisis of the online lending industry is far more dangerous than the thunder of the thunderstorm. The quality of online loan assets is always off-balance-sheet assets, including the loan-inducing business involved in financial institutions, all of which show off-balance-sheet assets, resulting in the inability to manage assets based on data. Coupled with the data islanding problem of pre-lending credit and post-lending risks, the default lenders can not be punished, and Lao Lai can still borrow on other platforms, leading to a vicious circle of risk accumulation.
If no one is an isolated island, in the field of consumer credit, no company’s risk control can be independent.
In the credit field, there are three things: collateral lending, mutual debt, and compensation, which can disrupt the mode of any cash lending company and a system. The reason is simple. Once the borrower encounters a debt crisis, it may not be able to pay for any company.
The bad debt rate of credit card within 2% of the banking industry is hard to maintain. The data of good performance may be the borrower’s compensation from the cash loan company; the low bad debt rate of the ants borrowing or Tencent micro-loan may also be borrowing People come from other cash-selling companies to “pay for loans”.
Common debt and risk control collective failure, more and more people lending, means more and more secondary assets, and the quality of assets is getting worse. The situation will get worse and worse.
When the mobile phone’s Xiaomi, the anti-virus 360, and the input dog of the input method all started to lend, all credit risk control, threshold, and loan will be disrupted.
The asset quality data for the entire credit and loan industry is contaminated.
The road to help with loans, while walking.
This article is from WeChat public account:< span class = "text-remarks"> new financial Luo Shu (ID: FintechBook) , author: Ray slow