[Editor’s Note]
As the absolute main force in the financial industry, the steady development of the banking and insurance industry has a bearing on the overall situation. According to a recent report by the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, in the first half of this year, cases of bancassurance institutions continued to show a high incidence, involving a total of 49.580 billion yuan, and a total of 585 bancassurance institution practitioners were taken compulsory measures. The main risks and problems presented by the case include the intertwining of financial corruption and business violations, the prominent endogenous problems of small and medium-sized banking institutions, the hidden risks of financial technology application, the outstanding moral hazard in the field of non-performing asset disposal, the renovation of personal housing loan fraud, and major insurance cases Six categories of serious harm. Where does the financial risk problem presented by the bancassurance industry originate, and how to prevent and resolve related risk problems? The news explores the above six types of risk questions one by one, trying to find some answers from them.
“I feel that there is no way to prevent it. The party discipline and state laws are in front of you, which can only serve as a deterrent.” On October 18, a person People from the financial market department of the local asset management company (hereafter referred to as local AMC) told the news when talking about how to prevent moral hazard in the field of non-performing asset disposal.
Non-performing assets are a burden for banks, but they are a big cake for professional non-performing assets disposal institutions. In recent years, with changes in the economic cycle, economic transformation and upgrading, and industrial structure adjustments, the credit quality of banks has also changed, and the generation of non-performing assets has also accelerated. However, the banks’ ability to dispose of non-performing assets is still limited, so they package and transfer non-performing assets at a discount.
For a long time, some financial corruption problems have focused on credit approval and issuance. With the rise and development of the non-performing asset transfer market, the scale of disposal of non-performing assets has become larger and larger In recent years, the problem of corruption in this link has been continuously exposed.
The disposal of non-performing assets involves multiple ports, including bank end, asset management company end, judicial end, etc. Each port has a corresponding risk point, and the most common focus is on the first two ports. As the initiation port for the disposal of non-performing assets, banking personnel have room for rent-seeking in many aspects such as debt reduction and exemption and pricing.
The China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission recently issued a notice on criminal cases involving bancassurance institutions in the first half of 2021, stating that the transfer (acceptance) of non-performing assets is subject to due diligence and review during investment. Inadequate management and control, lack of supervision and control of key business nodes and corresponding position personnel, key internal personnel use their core knowledgeDisposal of information, grabbing “assets”, and taking bribes to earn money are prominent.
The report pointed out that the relevant management personnel of the creditor’s rights transfer and transferee institutions and the heads of the enterprise dismissed them, forming the illusion of the creditor’s rights transfer and transfer, resulting in the transferee’s funds being embezzled by the enterprise He used. For example, in the case of embezzlement of 130 million yuan of funds from the Jilin branch of a certain asset management company, employees of the company, the head office of a policy bank and the branch of Jilin Province all participated.
The general manager of a local asset management company told the news, “Risk control measures and systems are often used to guard against the gentleman but not the villain. The selection of people is very important. Risks The prevention and control experience is more than before, and more emphasis is placed on it, but it cannot be completely prevented. Moral hazard is difficult to control, and it is largely a matter of personal values.”
The news found through multiple inquiries that what the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission had notified should be a case involving misappropriation of funds between China Great Wall Assets Jilin Branch and China Development Bank Jilin Branch. The figures mentioned in the case document also include Zhong Xiaolong, who served as the vice president of the Jilin Branch of China Development Bank and the president of Shandong Branch, and Chen Xiaobo, the former director of the Market and Investment Bureau of the China Development Bank’s head office. The former committed suicide at home in July 2019, while the latter was investigated before the former committed suicide. Soon after Chen Xiaobo was investigated, Hu Huaibang, the former party secretary and chairman of the China Development Bank, was “lost”.
In March of this year, the website of Jilin Banking and Insurance Regulatory Bureau disclosed multiple fines involving China Great Wall Assets Jilin Branch. The Jilin Branch of China Great Wall Assets Co., Ltd. was fined RMB 500,000 for acquiring false creditor rights and making additional investments due to negligence of due diligence, imprudent signing of the debt acquisition agreement, and imprudent payment of the debt acquisition price. The more critical one in this case is Sun Zhuocheng, who was the head of the Intermediate Business Department of China Great Wall Assets Jilin Branch.
The ticket shows that Sun Zhuocheng used his position to conspire with others to create the illusion of the company’s successful acquisition of debt, which in turn led the company to further increase fixed-income investments in the project . Sun Zhuocheng was directly responsible for the company’s acquisition of false creditor’s rights and additional investment project due diligence, negligence in due diligence, negligence in signing creditor’s rights acquisition agreements and negligence in payment of creditor’s rights, and was therefore prohibited from working in the banking industry for ten years.
Generally speaking, if a criminal case is involved, the administrative penalties issued by the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Bureau are often later than court decisions. In January 2020, China Judgment Documents Network disclosed the “Decision on Designation of Jurisdiction” made by the Intermediate People’s Court of Jilin City, Jilin Province, and designated the Changyi District People’s Court of Jilin City to make a real estate in Jiali, Jilin Province.The real estate development company, Sun Zhuocheng, Sun Lei and others will be tried in the case of bribery.
According to the “Indictment on the Misappropriation of Public Funds by Sun Zhuocheng, Sun Lei and Others” disclosed by the China Procuratorate and the “Jilin Province Jialicheng Real Estate Development” retained in the Tianyancha information The Criminal Judgment of the First Instance of the Crime of Bribery by Co., Ltd., Sun Zhuocheng, etc.”, this case involving RMB 130 million in embezzlement of funds has gradually become clear.
The court found that in September 2012, Du Guiyin, the legal representative of Jilin Jialicheng Real Estate Development Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as Jialicheng Real Estate) (later due to Passed away in a car accident) Under the introduction of Chen Xiaobo, the deputy director of the Investment Business Division II of the China Development Bank’s Market and Investment Bureau, a loan of 89.5 million yuan from the Jilin Branch of China Development Bank was used to build the first phase of the Golden Metropolis in Panshi City, Jilin Province. project. Jialicheng Real Estate repaid a total of 14 million yuan in loans from the Jilin Province Branch of China Development Bank in September and December 2013.
In order to build the second phase of the Golden Metropolis, Du Guiyin used Chen Xiaobo to find the then China Great Wall Assets Changchun Office (the predecessor of China Great Wall Assets Jilin Branch). Sun Zhuocheng, the head of the business department, sought the company’s financing for Jialicheng. After Du Guiyin died in a car accident, Du Jun became the legal representative of Jialicheng Real Estate, and Sun Lei became a shareholder of Jialicheng Real Estate through equity transfer.
In December 2013, China Great Wall Assets approved the approval of China Great Wall Assets Changchun Office to acquire the remaining capital of the loan to Jialicheng Real Estate from the China Development Bank’s Jilin Branch for 75.5 million yuan. The implementation plan of making an additional investment of RMB 75.5 million in debts of RMB 75.5 million and using equity as collateral to invest an additional RMB 54.5 million in Jialicheng Real Estate. In the process of approving the implementation plan, Sun Zhuocheng demanded 200,000 yuan from Du Jun on the grounds that the approval process required “fees” that month.
In January 2014, when the Jilin Branch of China Development Bank did not agree to sell the creditor’s rights of Jialicheng Real Estate, Sun Zhuocheng took advantage of his position to cooperate with Chen Xiaobo, Sun Lei, Du Jun conspired to forge the “Debt Assignment Agreement” and “About the Golden Metropolitan Bank’s Jilin Provincial Branch’s “Debt Assignment Agreement” between the Changchun Office of the Great Wall Assets Corporation and the China Development Bank’s Jilin Provincial Branch by privately engraving the official seal of the Jilin Branch of China Development Bank and special contract seals. With the help of Zheng Kai, the deputy director of the fifth customer department of the Jilin Branch of China Development Bank at the time, the Changchun Office of the Great Wall Assets Company successfully purchased the non-performing asset debt package of the Jilin Branch of China Development Bank. Illusion.
Two months later, Changchun Office of Great Wall Assets Company will invest RMB 75.5 million in GarleyCheng Real Estate’s account in the Jilin Branch of China Development Bank, and Beijing Great Wall Changxing Urbanization Construction Investment Fund (Limited Partnership) entrusted Bank of China to deposit 54.5 million yuan into Jialicheng’s account in Bank of China Co., Ltd. Sun Lei and Du Jun used the method of fictitious purchase and sale contracts, in the name of project funds and materials, and with the help of Zheng Kai, they used the 66.1 million yuan of creditor’s rights transfer funds for other purposes; Sun Lei and Du Jun took the same method. The additional investment of 54.5 million yuan was diverted, and a total of 120.6 million yuan was diverted by Jialicheng Real Estate for other purposes and could not be returned.
After the incident, Sun Lei, a shareholder of Jialicheng Real Estate, paid a bribe of 300,000 Euros (equivalent to RMB 2,541,480) to Chen Xiaobo and RMB 1 million to Sun Zhuocheng (Sun Zhuocheng received bribes totaling RMB 1.2 million yuan); Chen Xiaobo paid a bribe of 10,000 euros (equivalent to RMB 84,716) to Zheng Kai for his help.
Chen Xiaobo stated in his statement: “On March 13, 2014, Sun Lei called me and asked me to communicate about the CDB payment and promise to pay. When I came out, I told him to prepare the intermediate fee and exchange it into foreign currency. Sun Lei said don’t worry. I called Zheng Kai the next day, and he said that as long as the money is transferred to the general account, the payment will be fine. I called Zhong Xiaolong again. I made a call and asked him to pay attention to it, and all agreed. The money was spent. At the weekend, at the Jinan Hotel, Sun Lei gave me 360,000 euros, each with a face value of 500 yuan, a total of seven wads. The money actually included Zhong Xiaolong, Zheng Kai, and Li, but I just gave Zheng Kai some money.”
According to Zheng Kai’s confession, his He confessed that at the end of November 2013, Chen Xiaobo introduced Sun Zhuocheng to him, saying that Great Wall Assets would purchase all the assets of the development bank’s Jialicheng project and would also make additional investments in the Jialicheng project, totaling 130 million yuan.
Finally, the court sentenced Sun Zhuocheng to 16 years’ imprisonment and fined 200,000 yuan; Sun Lei 15 years’ imprisonment and fined 300,000 yuan; Chen Xiaobo 19 Years, and fined 400,000 yuan; Du Jun was imprisoned for 10 years and fined 200,000 yuan; Zheng Kai was imprisoned for 6 years.
According to previous media reports, the investigation of Chen Xiaobo also revealed a case in which China Development Bank’s Jilin Branch’s illegal guarantee caused huge losses for many years and was suspected of illegal transfer of benefits. . The 130 million yuan case notified by the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission this time may be just the tip of the iceberg. The
report also revealed chaos in other areas of non-performing asset disposal. For example, the disposal of assets is transferred by agreement but not introducedThe competition mechanism and even the “top leader” of the organization helps the predecessor to become the sole buyer, and coordinate the reduction or exemption of commissions to reduce the total purchase price, and take the opportunity to solicit and accept bribes.
According to the relevant regulations of the regulatory authorities, the transfer of non-performing assets of commercial banks should follow the principles of openness, transparency, and competitive selection. Priority should be given to public transfer methods such as bidding, bidding, auctions, etc. , Transfer to the four major AMCs or local AMCs, fully compete and avoid irrational bidding.
A person from the management of an asset company told the news that some of them will be transferred by agreement. There are also asset companies that have separate regulations. For example, for some asset companies that are state-owned to state-owned, they can negotiate their own regulations, but they have to bear great audit responsibilities. Most asset companies require public disposal, even among state-owned enterprises.
“The approval chain of asset management companies is shorter than that of banks, and it is easy to corrode. This is natural. Large banks have hundreds of thousands of people, and only a few asset management companies People? Banks have strong audits and weak businesses, while asset management companies are on the contrary. The proportion of legal and financial professionals in asset management companies’ front desk staff is much higher than that of banks, and audits are easier to break through.” The above-mentioned local AMC Financial Market Department The person said that if the counterparty is a state-owned enterprise, it can be transferred by agreement. There are different opinions on the competition mechanism. If the introduction of the accompany target is meaningless, the room for operation is relatively large.