This article is from WeChat public account: Senior King Laohan (ID: chairmanJLH), Author: Golden old man no carts, head of FIG. Source: Vision China

I wrote about video wars in 2017 and again in 2019. Now that the war is coming to an end, and standing in front of a closer and closer end, I think it is worthwhile to continue to talk about the video war in 2020. .

Why are you standing in front of the end? It should be said that 2019 is an extremely “definite” year. The reason why we say “OK” is because there is a lack of “change” in the video field. In the mobile Internet where there are almost no new subscribers, all the new additions come from the current short video business, and the entire video field has lost its pattern change.

The entire video field has changed from a local war conflict to a situation where everyone needs to think about how to deal with the two poles of Douyin Express. Douyin Express is a US-Soviet video field.

In this situation, everyone should be unexpected at first. Douyin’s DAU rose from 250 million in 2018 to 400 million in 2019. With such a large base, Douyin can still increase DAU by 60% a year. This is almost a miracle. And his main competitors are from 160 million in 2018, and his goal is to exceed 300 million by the Spring Festival of 2020. (A few days ago, there was a small news that this goal has (Completed) , the YoY growth rate of this DAU has reached an exaggerated 87.5%.

In contrast, long video sites like iQiyi have a DAU of 126 million in 2017 and a DAU of 135 million in 2018, with YoY growing by 7.14%. The official DAU data for 2019 has not been disclosed, but we have reasons to believe that the increase in DAU may be around 5%. Compared with short videos, the growth of active users on the long video track is negligible.

What about PUGC? The situation is slightly better. Taking station B as an example, the MAU of station B in Q3 of 2019 reached 128 million, and YoY growth rate was 38%. Although the 2019 annual report has not been issued, I estimate that the YoY growth rate of MAU in the end of the year will be about 35%. s level. It ’s a lot better to look at it this way, but we ca n’t forget that Station B is a 37 million DAU (Q3, 2019) level and is active When the user base is an order of magnitude smaller, YoY’s growth rate is basically only about half that of the leader in the short video industry. This situation can not be regarded as a optimistic situation in the long-term growth potential of small stations.

The situation in the live broadcast field is similar to that in the PUGC field. The MAUs of Douyu and Huya (Q3 in 2019) are 164 million and 146 million, YoY’s growth rate is less than 20% and about 30%. It should be said that it is OK to look at the overall growth independently, but if you compare the vibrato and fast hands that are several times higher than the base, the overall performance is very ordinary. As for YY, whose main market is not domestic, and YoY, which has a 3% YoY growth rate in MAU, basically, the gap in the size of active users in the domestic market will be gradually widened by Douyu and Huya. -remarks “label =” Remarks “> (Although in terms of revenue level, YY and Momo are still leading temporarily) .

Next, we can look at how each vibrato and fast player put pressure on each player on each local battlefield.

1. Long video

Long video, or 2019 we are more accustomed to called “Aiyou Teng” troika, is a very difficult year. The problems encountered by iQiyi can be said to be very obvious, and basically represent the problems of the current three long video companies.

1. Advertising revenue is falling rapidly;

2. Member’s growth rate is declining and penetration is under pressure;

3. The overall income potential has entered a bottleneck period.

↑ The growth rate of iQiyi’s advertising revenue has begun to decline since Q3 of 18, and the current quarter-on-quarter and year-on-year growth rates are both negatively increasing.

↑ And iQiyi’s membership growth is also rapidly declining, and membership growth will soon stagnate because the penetration rate reaches the ceiling.

↑ The addition of members has gradually come to a halt, and the growth rate of member income has also shown a downward trend.

↑ The year-on-year and month-on-month growth rates of the two members + advertising revenues are declining rapidly throughout 2019, and it is clearly entering a bottleneck period

It is not difficult to guess what caused the rapid decline in advertising. Iqiyi wrote clearly in his financial report: Is challenged by information flow advertising. This challenge not only comes from Douyin, Quick Hand, or other product matrices of Byte Beat, or the pangolin of Byte Beat, but also includes the impact of his family ’s good-looking video Baidu. This is an external cause.

In terms of internal factors, member income is zero-sum with advertising revenue .

It is clearly written in iQiyi’s membership rights that members have exclusive advertising privileges, reducing the time of pre-roll advertising. Of course, iQIYI is enough chicken thieves. The only way to buy members is to remove “front” and “sticker” advertisements, and it is “reduction”, not “elimination”. That is, members have to watch at least 5 seconds of pre-roll ads, and the small theaters, corner advertisements, post-roll ads, pause ads, etc. inserted in the middle are not in the membership privileges.

But no matter how many chicken thieves, the essence of members is that they don’t want to watch advertisements. The more people who are willing to spend money, the fewer people are willing to watch advertisements. And the rest are people who would rather watch ads than spend a little money. Where is the advertising value of these people?

Even if there is no external impact, with the increase in the number of members, iQiyi’s advertising revenue will inevitably fall into a cliff when its member penetration rate passes a certain threshold. Therefore, we can also say that iQiyi’s advertising revenue will inevitably collapse under internal and external problems. Of course, due to external factors, iQiyi’s advertising revenue will not be defeated before membership revenue is fully established.

Advertising revenue is expected to decline, which is basically to be expected, so this is not the worst news yet.

When I wrote video warfare 2019 last year, I did a predictive analysis. I said that if iQiyi wants to keep the ROI level unchanged, then the paid members in 2019 need to reach about 140 million, and Dr. Gong Yu himself at the beginning of the year The target set is not less than 130 million. But in fact, although the annual report for 2019 has not been released, iQiyi, which has reached 105.6 million registered members in Q3, is basically impossible to complete the addition of 30 million paid members in Q4. It is said that iQiyi has also lowered this target between Q2 and Q3 2019.

In other words, the original ROI is only less than half of Netflix ’s iQiyi. The output efficiency of content purchased in 2018 has decreased in 2019. The first 3 Qs of iQiyi 2019 have completed about $ 1.5 billion in member revenue. At present I predict that Iqiyi 2019 will complete about $ 580 million in member revenue in Q4, which can be completed throughout the year. Member income is about US $ 2.092 billion, and the number of paid members can reach 112 million by the end of 2019. If calculated according to my prediction, the ROI level of iQiyi’s paid members will fall from about 0.85 in the past two years to a level of 0.66.

In essence, the ROI problem is caused by the lack of ARPPU (Average Paying User Revenue) . Member growth is now under pressure. Solving the ARPPU problem becomes In order to solve the problems of iQiyi and Tencent, (emm, Youku is behind the MAU, membership growth is still the theme, and the ARPPU problem is not as sharp as the other two ) .

In order to raise ARPPU, it directly led to iViyi and Tencent’s VVIP preemptive storm.

But I must say that this is the dumbest way I have ever seen. In the case of “Chen Qingling”, which made Tencent Video taste the first taste, at that time, VVIP was paid for an additional single episode, and Internet transmission received a total of 156 million. I checked it on my own information channel, and the exact number is similar to this number. This result sounds good at first glance, but if we estimate the ARPPU based on the paid members of Tencent Video Q3 2019, in fact, the overall increase is only about 1.5 yuan. This level improves the annual ARPPU by about 1%. As far as I know, the income from the single episode of “Qing Yu Nian” is still slightly lower than that of “Chen Qingling”.

Headline dramas like “Chen Qingling” and “Qing Yu Nian”, about one Q for each Q, probably for the whole yearAbout four. That’s an increase of almost 5% for the entire year’s ARPPU. This strategy of increasing the ARPPU by 5% will also be criticized, which involves infringing on the vested interests of VIPs, causing some VIP members to unsubscribe and activate the pirated market. It can really be said to be a strategy with very low returns.

Obviously, it is a bad idea to create new payment points by infringing on the vested interests of members to promote ARPPU. However, Aiyouteng did not dare to directly raise the price of members. Last year, I said that interactive drama is a new category worthy of attention because the new category is suitable for high ARPPU paid trials, but it seems that the progress of various interactive dramas is very headache, this is another story. .

In short, whether the advertising revenue is falling or the ROI of content to members is low or the ARPPU value is slowly increasing, these are not the worst news at present.

For long videos, the more deadly problem is the length of contention. Or to be precise, short video competing for long video advertising share, ceiling of paid member penetration , these problems are just one of the inevitable results of the long share competition.

↑ In December 2018, the single-month duration of Douyin Kuaishou ’s video accounted for more than the first time in the video field for the first time. p>

The contention for duration is more fundamental. Chinese netizens surf the Internet 6 hours a day. The time of day is zero-sum. Users vote with their feet, play games, and watch videos. Who spends time on this is not the same or the other. If you lose time, you lose the growth potential of MAU, you lose the growth potential of members, you lose Ad loads and fill rates for advertising revenue, and you lose the premium power of revenue.

What determines the length of time is the choice of the user, which form of entertainment is more needed by Chinese Internet users, and which form of entertainment is currently preferred by Chinese users now and in the future.

Of course, some friends will definitely say that Netflix is ​​not doing well? I don’t see how American short videos have made Netflix. This is really a point, and Netflix will not be doing well in 2019. The Chinese are familiar with the three-legged long video of China, and now the long video market in the United States has also been divided for a long time. Now Disney +, Netflix, and HBO + WB are also the three-legged tripod. Prime stabbed two swords aside) , Netflix’s life is also difficult.

2020 should be the biggest financial pressure for Netflix in the past few years. After all, the high content purchase costs will never be reduced during the content war, and the US video war has escalated. This kind of war of attrition is a day that nobody knows.

In essence, long videos are not a good business. Scale barriers are entirely built on content procurement, and the supply and demand markets for content are highly centralized, which directly results in the supply and demand sides not having sufficient bargaining power. I used to jokingly said that China ’s long video industry, 3 networks and 4 units (You Ai Teng, Hunan, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Dongfang Four Davids) In addition to 20 top-level dramas and variety CPs, a maximum of one classroom, 30 people will have a half-day meeting to give what the Chinese will watch in the coming year.

Such a market needs change, of course.

The first human movie was actually a short video, purely recording scenes. The birth of feature films has gone through a process, and commercial films have gone through another process. I have said before that the length of a commercial movie is not determined by the single condition of the audience ’s experience, but by the balance between the cost of filming, the experience of the audience, and the cost of the theater. As soon as the television media is renewed, the length of the “episode” has completely changed.

Now that in the new medium, the “length” of the content can be redefined. As long as you can ensure that the comprehensive experience brought by “story plot” and “sensory stimulation” can keep the audience’s flow, what kind of black box paradigm is in the middle of content is not a dogmatic thing. (this matter is also very important, I have the opportunity to write the content paradigm separately) .

So who shoots, how professional must be to be effective, this matter,After all, it is the person who consumes the content.

↑ Watching the “excerpts” of popular TV dramas on Douyin, you can almost watch a TV drama in seven hundred seventy-eight.

↑ Kuaishou has been testing “long video” content for a long time, and it is still a paid subscription

I believe that for a long time in the future, human beings will still need to see a “story”. After all, this matter is determined by the structure of our human brain. But “TV” is not our “final” choice. The more advanced recommendation algorithm brings the short video entertainment to the limit of the user ’s entertainment efficiency. It is not difficult to add the content of the long video to the entrance of the short video platform.

↑ TED sharing, Uri Hasson: This is your brain on communication. Regarding why the brain needs a story, friends who are interested can go to TED official website, YouTube or B station to find it

To this day, I can almost say in a sad tone: Once the online video platform was a revolutionary, they wanted to subvert the past TV, but the revolution was not completed, and the new revolutionary has pushed these pioneers to the corner. This is also no way out.

So from my personal perspective, I now hold a pessimistic attitude towards the future development of the long video platform. Of course, no matter whether it is vibrato or fast hand, it will not enter the PGC video field so fast. At least in 2020, they can’t afford to spend that 10 billion content purchase costs per year.

But we have clearly seen a possible future. And we also know that backward productivity will eventually be eliminated.

2.PUGCVideo Community

After talking the long video, let ’s talk about the PUGC video community. It is a subdivision field, but in fact there are not many companies in it. The main ones are currently active in China, that is, station B and Xiaohongshu. In addition, there are actually no UGC watermelon videos and station A that is easy to forget. . This time we are still talking about station B.

After Station B recently hosted a “highly acclaimed” New Year’s Eve party, the stock price soared, pushing the market value directly over 7 billion US dollars. My circle of friends is also a word of beauty. It probably means that the New Year’s Eve Party at Station B has been used as a benchmark to redefine the New Year’s Eve Party and it is respect for the victory of young people.

B station did develop fairly well in 2019. As the first official official media of KOL, a young domestic operation, 800 million won the right to broadcast the finals of the three-year final of the LOLS, and the anchor also won Feng Ti Mo, in addition to ACGN, a large number of popular science UP masters appeared in the content.

Eye-sighted people can see it. In station B, this is to tell the story of Generation Z, to maintain the position of the video community, and to force the commercialization of live broadcast.

But the situation may not be as optimistic as the outside world thinks. When I wrote “History of YouTube Development in China” last year, I clearly mentioned that station B is currently the platform closest to the YouTube ecosystem in China, but station B is too small. That’s right, the biggest problem of station B is that it is still too small.

I think there have been two major problems in Station B for a long time:

1. Generation Z population size, how much can station B eventually serve;

2. The correlation between commercialization and MAU is low, and the commercialization efficiency is poor.

Regarding the number of users at station B, I saw a statement some time ago, and I take it seriously:


The ceiling of users at station B is far less than that of “Generation Z” / pan-young people. The penetration rate of station B in cities with more economic development tends to be higher, because young people in these places can see text-remarks “label =” Remarks “> (determined by the degree of openness) You can also understand (It happens that watermelon video has been stopped at this position for more than a year.) . According to the B station’s Q3 2019 level of 37 million DAU, the 50 million pressure level should basically be encountered in Q4 of 2020.

As early as 2017, when I was writing “Some Studies on Young People (Part II)”, I wrote this sentence at the end of the text: the DAU of station B is about 25 million; the DAU of fast hand is about 80 million about. Their core users are all post-90s.

Now these young people not only have fast hands, they also have vibrato. For station B, the most terrible opponents at present are not Aofei and A station, which are written in the exclusive object of investment, nor are they fighting fish and tiger teeth in the field of game live broadcast, but vibrato and quick hands.

On the surface, Station B has a strong “cultural” distinction. It seems that Douyin and Quickhand have no effect on the growth of Station B. Station B has not been impacted by the top two in recent years. But in my opinion, this is mainly because station B was too small before and the development speed has been kept at a relatively low speed, so in the basic disk of its own, station B can go slowly and be determined to develop.

When station B develops to a pressure level that requires sinking and generalization, you will find that it is all others ’place to cross the hill.

When I went to the Douyin Creators Conference on August 24, 2019, Douyin released a series of 15-minute videos and video collections on the day. Zhang Nan also defined Douyin for the first time in public. “Encyclopedia of Video.” I sent two circles of friends at that time.

(this sentence comes from Pan Luan) .

Chen Rui warned young entrepreneurs in an entrepreneurship sharing event in 2015: Do n’t do things that extend the business of large companies, then you wo n’t even know how to die. It’s a pity that Station B, once seen by Dachang as being unable to attend school, is now standing on the business extension line of Douyin and Kuaishou.

If both the vibrato and the fast player are still growing rapidly, and there is room for expansion, it is not a bad thing for station B, but now the two have hit almost no new room, and there are 40 million DAU in their pockets. Station B is really guilty of it.

At this time, the second problem of station B, “commercialization and low MAU,” became very fatal. Although the revenue of the three Q’s financial reports of station B in 2019 is actually good, especially for the live broadcast and value-added services, the YoY growth rate of the three consecutive Qs has not fallen below 150%.

In fact, the revenue of major members YoY is increasing by about 120% on station B. The growth rate brought by the live broadcast business income will be even greater in the future. At 4: 6) . Maintaining such a high growth rate is actually due to the fact that the original base is too small. The live broadcast and value-added services of the first three Qs in station B totaled 1.07 billion yuan in revenue . Given that the financial report for 2019 has not yet been released, I predict that this part of the year should be about 1.6 billion yuan. Then the annual income of the big members of station B is about 600 million yuan, while the live broadcast income is about 1 billion yuan. If this level is comparable to the MAU level, the annual live broadcast income of station B is roughly equivalent to the level of live broadcast income of Huya or Douyu for 1.5 months.

I calculated it. The ARPU of DAU at station B is about 0.56 yuan. This level is actually close to the current tremolo.ARPU of the hand (The fast vibrato is about 0.5 ~ 0.7) , but most of them have little to do with MAU Game Revenue . If you only calculate the (strong total of 700 million in Q3 2019) for live broadcast and value-added services and advertising revenue, this part of the ARPU of DAU is probably It’s 0.21 yuan.

If station B wants to raise the level of commercialization efficiency to the level of Douyin fast player, at least it needs to increase the revenue of live broadcast and value-added services and advertising by 200% YoY in 2020.

If you just look at the current growth rate, the most likely breakthrough point for station B is live broadcast revenue. In fact, station B did exactly that, because the live broadcast income is relatively easy to measure, and there are fewer problems related to the “cultural atmosphere” of station B users, which is an easier entry point. I will talk about the content of the live broadcast in the next chapter. In general, The live broadcast of station B is the road of the guild show , and the overall operation will be very heavy and the scale will be relatively large.

↑ After the guild show, the operation method of live broadcast anchors at station B has also started to be radical.

But from the perspective of income, whether the live broadcast of station B can be done finally depends on the ARPPU of the head user, because the guild show live broadcast mode has a higher correlation with ARPPU and a weaker correlation with MAU. Therefore, the overall live broadcast penetration process is actually not as good as researching and improving the operation tools of ARPPU. In this regard, the MAU of station B is not large, and most users’ payment ability is not strong, but it is not a particularly large weakness.

3.Live

The video war series is actually the first time I chat about this vertical field. I did n’t want to talk in the past, mainly because the live broadcast is a complex but less than 100 billion market scale, which is costly to study (Money) In essence, it is difficult to create a “winner-take-all” situation, so I think it may be more appropriate to put a single article in this series.

But since 2018, things have changed. By 2020, I have to write about the field of live broadcasting, because it has become the second main battlefield.

↑ Revenue scale of major domestic live broadcast platforms in 2018-2019 (inaccurate)

Things are actually very simple. Quickstart has been a player that cannot be ignored since the commercialization of live broadcast in 2017. By 2018, it has suddenly become a Chinese (And even the world) The # 1 live streaming platform (Major Google has never released YouTube’s financial data, and there is no accurate data on YouTube’s live streaming income Scale) . Then Douyin followed up.

The short video Twins entered the track. It took less than a year, and all the first, second and third places on the track changed their seats. (YY is still the third largest on the surface, but most of YY’s income is in overseas markets, soCounting domestic business, YY will not be in the third position) . In 2019, domestic live broadcast platforms, if ranked according to the size of domestic revenue, are Kuaishou, Douyin and Tencent Music Group. That’s right, Huya fighting fish can only maintain the younger brother’s attitude at the moment, and the live broadcast of Xiaobao Station can only show a “good-looking .jpg” expression, and obediently become younger brother-in-law.

Actually, according to the (unreliable) information I have obtained, Fasthand’s live broadcast revenue has reached Q3 2019 At a scale of 3 billion yuan a month, Douyin basically caught up to this level at the end of the year. The Douyin and Kuaishou’s current live broadcast revenue for one month is more than that of Huya and Douyu for one quarter.

Douyin and Kuaishou successfully made the domestic live broadcast market break through the 100 billion scale, and occupied more than 50% of the market share.

Fasthand and Douyin have also creatively opened up new ideas for the business model of live broadcast. There are currently two business models for live broadcast:

  1. A show mode with a high degree of guild involvement, relying on head anchors and guild and platform operations for high conversion, relying more on ARPPU, closer to the business model of the game;


  2. The fast hand mode with low level of guild involvement depends on the platform ’s massive MAU and the private domain ecological transformation of the anchor. It is more dependent on MAU, ARPPU is lower, and ARPU and ARPPU are much less discrete.



    Strictly speaking at present, Except for the fast hand, most domestic live broadcast platforms have adopted the first show mode, and the vibrato data structure should be more favored to the fast hand mode .

    The two models rely on different core drivers, and the content displayed intuitively is also very different. The scale of the show mode is often large, and the rooms are also large. The revenue goal is achieved by operating a large R (high-paying users) . In the fast-hand mode, small rooms are more common, and there is basically no large scale, and users’ payments are closer to the “red envelope” in WeChat.

    Of course, no matter what mode, because live broadcast requiresThe high concentration of attention for a long time, the experience that cannot be interrupted, and the characteristics of high ARPU, basically have a consensus in the industry, Live is a commercial service that “consumes” traffic . The party with the larger MAU penetration must have more advantages. In the case of MAU obtained mainly through procurement flow, it is natural that the party with higher ARPU can spend more money to purchase flow.

    In the past, platforms that used the show mode in order to compete for higher ARPU and traffic would compete for head anchors. This is why station B needs to sign Von Timo.

    ↑ Someone crawled Feng Timo’s premiere data at station B

    However, the data of Feng Timo’s premiere at station B does not look very good, which is about 890,000 yuan in income, which is far lower than her previous level in Douyu. The cause of this phenomenon, I guess it may be one of the following three:

    1. Feng Timo itself is not very suitable for station B traffic. However, the cost of Feng Timo is said to be not low. It is reported that Feng Timo has offered more than 50 million yuan, and Douyu has not left. Therefore, the price range of Feng Timo won by station B should be no less than 50 million and no more than 100 million;


    2. The MAU penetration rate of the original live broadcast service of station B is extremely low. It is a question whether a high degree of guild will improve the penetration rate;


    3. The potential of ARPPU broadcast on station B is actually not high. The ability to pay for too young users is actually a problem (especially the economic situation in the past two years, it is not that the rich second generation may not have that much purchasing power) ;



      But for any of the above reasons, you can see from the live broadcast rights of Feng Timo and S.The impact of major live broadcast platforms is actually indirect. I also said earlier that live broadcast is generally regarded as a commercial service that “consumes” traffic, mainly because live broadcast does not produce “free” traffic. Therefore, the live broadcast service of each platform is actually carried out by Base on its own MAU scale, and each of them will not compete and interfere with each other. The traffic competition of the previous live broadcast platform was mainly carried out by grabbing head anchors and competing advertisements.

      So even in the fast-growing 2019 and fast-growing live broadcast business, in fact the revenue of the entire live broadcast industry is growing, and the growth rate is not slow. The big reason is that the major platforms have increased the payment rate and ARPPU. So how does the fast hand and vibrato indirectly affect the live broadcast platform?

      The effect is mainly through traffic prices. Because for Douyin and Kuaishou, selling traffic to other live broadcast platforms to watch live broadcasts earns advertising revenue, and leaving those users who want to watch live broadcasts to earn live broadcast revenue on their own platforms, as long as other platforms also have Per DAU The gross profit is profitable, and the vibrato fast hand is necessary for making this money. The calculation method is very simple, that is to calculate the ARPU of Per DAU. The ARPU per DAU of Douyin and Kuaishou is basically between 0.5 and 0.7 yuan, so as long as the ARPU that directly earns live broadcast income is higher than this range, Douyin and Kuaishou will make more money. After all, for 400 million and 3 For products with a scale of 100 million DAU, even if ARPU is only 0.1 higher, it will earn 30-40 million more a day.

      So on the other hand, if other live broadcast platforms want to buy traffic from the Douyin and Kuaishou traffic pools, it must be more expensive than Douya and Kuaishou to do live streaming. This will reduce the gross profit. , Threatening the overall profitability. Of course, this problem is not so fatal in the short term.

      In general, live streaming is the cash-cow of each platform. (Cash Cows) Commercialization has become the hottest competition. Battlefield II. In 2020, if no other factors are encountered, the live broadcast business is likely to continue to grow at a high speed. Compared with the show mode that asks for overdraft vitality, I am more optimistic about the long-term performance of the fast hand mode. However, compared to the positive battlefield of short video business, this is still not exciting enough.

      4. Short video

      Diu Yin announced on January 5th, 2020 that the DAU reached 400 million, and within a few days there was a gossip that Xuancheng Fast DAU also reached 300 million. Regardless of whether the fast hand has reached 300 million, IWe all know that next week’s Spring Festival, fast hands will definitely be there.

      ↑ Questmobile’s Douyin, Quick Hands and Volcano DAU Trends

      The numbers of Douyin and Quick DAU data on QM always have some gaps with the two. Generally, the monitoring of these two does not seem to be accurate, but the basic problems in the general trend are not large. (such as the negative increase in DAU caused by Douyin and Kuaishou during the period from August to September 2019) .

      I personally have a judgment on the two growth trends in early 2019. Basically, there is a high probability that the vibrato will reach 400 million DAU first, and for the fast players, the pressure of 300 million DAU is not so great. In the overall growth rate of the two, the YoY growth rate of the fast hand will be higher. Now look at the basic situation is not much different from the forecast.

      I do n’t have as many opinions about the volcano merged with volcanoes on the Internet. My perception is simpler and more direct. With the bytes I know, this is a very pragmatic and high-efficiency company, and such companies will naturally respect Occam’s razor. In my opinion, the combination of Douyin and Volcano fully demonstrates that Douyin has been able to perform well in sinking markets in terms of algorithm and content, and the overlap between the two in DAU is not low. Douyin can provide coverage to volcano users. , Then just let Douyin serve users of the volcano.

      From the DAU potential of the volcano over the past year, it has been in a downward trend. Both DAU and duration are in a state of negative growth. This is not because the volcano does not work hard, but it should be said that the vibrato and fast hand are too good. It has been difficult for the market to accommodate inefficient products for a long time. Since it is better to merge Douyin and Volcano directly, reduce repetitive labor and improve communication efficiency within the team. I think this is the basic demand for the combination of Douyin and Volcano.

      In terms of DAU data, after the addition of DAU to the vibrato caused by the merger, it is likely to be less than 10 million. So the outside world is basically joking about adding 50 million DAU directly.

      The addition of the fast-handed main-end product is already good, and the addition of the speed version is even more amazing. Compared with the fast hand at the end of 2019 and the fast hand at the beginning of 2018, the temperament has changed dramatically. From the state of being “snored” by the vibrato, it has completely sobered up, and has presented a fighting posture as a whole, and the combat effectiveness Vulgar. Moreover, the PR of the fast hand has also made great progress. By telling the story of the “ordinary people”, more people can see the “silent majority” of the fast hand, and begin to present a different charm of the fast hand, and have positive energy. And social values. This is commendable.

      ↑ “The 49 Tombstones in Fast Hands” really shocked me deeply and truly.

      (seeking mergers and acquisitions by some teams with content and algorithm advantages in India, Right?) .

      In general, TikTok is under the leadership of Alex Zhu, and it will be a hit in 2019. Kwai is also Su Hua’s personal supervisor, which has greatly improved from 2018, and is now catching up. It is very likely that in the global market, the last two can also play 37 or 46. Regardless of Facebook or Google, in fact, they have lagged behind the two Chinese companies in terms of products or algorithms and methodologies. So Xiaozha had to make some “dirty tricks” to create a time window for herself.

      So the two biggest challenges in the global market today are actually populism and anti-globalization in countries around the world. In their current size, the two have not yet started to compete in the global market. It is really difficult for me to predict the final result.

      Let’s talk about two products in China that have completed “transformation and evolution.”

      This change is actually a qualitative change caused by quantitative changes. Both users are large enough, so the two have begun to replace the “native features” of smartphones and become “more basic services.”

      The short video app mainly replaces the three functions of “camera”, “album” and “share”. Corresponding to the underlying requirements logic of “shoot”, “see” and “connect”.

      This thing is like “What about Baidu” = “Search” or WeChat = Contacts + Phonebook. With today’s active user volume, Douyin and Kuaishou have become more low-level. One very interesting thing is that the Douyin app was released before Douyin. In fact, it was because Kuaiying, launched by Kuaishou, became the favorite editing software of Douyin users. In order to fight against fast hands, Douyin launched a cut screen. But whether it’s editing or quick, it has replaced the native editing software of the smartphone.

      This phenomenon will eventually evolve into, When we, as ordinary users, need to record and share, one day we will pick up the mobile phone and say “Hang on, I will take a shake / quick hand” to my friends. This matter may be the ultimate direction of Tencent’s most feared vibrato evolution, because if it is just a “new way of entertainment”, it will not move the foundation of Tencent. But once the incident evolved into a “new connection method”, it would be a fatal blow to Tencent.

      Are there such changes in history? Instagram is the lesson of the car ahead (A friend of mine Pan and I said that he would write about it, and we are all looking forward to this article.) . Back in early 2018, I That is to say, Douyin and Kuaishou are competing for the position of “China’s Instagram”. Actually, they are still competing, but in the process, they may steal part of YouTube’s niche. In this way, China will inevitably give birth to a smartphone-based Camera and video super-connected platform, I’m a little excited to think of it here.

      From the perspective of the entire transformation process, Kuaishou has reached the level of this “basic service” in some markets because of its penetration rate advantage. However, Douyin thinks that it is larger in scale, and the overall transformation speed and users Cognitively may be more advantageous.

      I ca n’t see the end of this winner. There are too many changes, but I ’m sure that the competition between the two in 2020 will be based on this theme.

      To sum up, the current structure of the short video industry will not change much in 2020. Except for the successful way of sneaking into Pearl Harbor like brushing treasures, new players are completely impossible to survive, even if they can barely find The niche can only be used as an insignificant “benthos”. The short video duo has evolved into two poles in the video field. The next growth in China and the expansion of business extension depends entirely on the speed of other video fields.

      Judging from the current speed of the two, the war can continue for at least one year, and there should be no way to distinguish between victory and defeat in 2020. After all, the fast hand lags behind Douyin, but Tencent’s father is willing to help. As we in this new ecology, we must understand one thing. The era of new productivity is irreversible.

      Master, times have changed.

      Write at the end

      The third chapter of the video war series is coming. In fact, I feel that this series should not be written for too long. Because of my FA work, I have been exposed to many video-based social, community, and entertainment projects in 2019. But their development in 2019 is really disheartening. When I look back at why this is happening, I suddenly find that the entertainment needs of the Chinese are being completely filled by Douyin and Kuaishou.

      This filling is starting to reflect on me, if even start-upsOf small companies are affected, and it’s hard to believe that big companies can be spared the challenge. So after looking at the data for a whole year, I was sure that Douyin and Kuaishou have developed into products with completely different properties than in 2018.

      The heroes in the world, under the shaking, are all chickens and dogs.

      2019 ~ 2020 should be a period of qualitative change caused by the quantitative change of the two products. At the end of 2018, I calculated based on the number of netizens in the era of China Mobile Internet. The DAU pressure of short video applications should be between 4-450 million. The vibrato has arrived first. The fast hand is affected by the penetration of vibrato, which may only be unlimited Close. So if anyone can take the lead in breaking through this barrier, then it can almost be assumed that who completed the qualitative change first.

      In this context, as entrepreneurs, rather than confront them, it is better to look for opportunities under bipolar competition. Including but not limited to being MCN, being a content creator, being a consumer brand based on a new ecology, and so on.

      Now that the times have changed, take advantage of it. Above, thank you all.

      PS: All data in this article are collected by individuals through public channels and personal channels. It is difficult to guarantee the accuracy of the data. Not recommended as an investment reference.

      This article comes from WeChat public account: round first gold old man (ID: chairmanJLH) , author: Golden old man does carts