As the New Coronary Pneumonia epidemic subsides in China, the focus of national work and policies has gradually shifted to the next stage of China’s economic recovery and development. How to push the economic policy in the next stage can more effectively promote the return of China’s economy to normal, stable and healthy growth, which has become a hot topic in multi-party games.
Of the traditional economic policy tools, monetary policy and fiscal policy are the two most important components. Monetary policy has a clear role in maintaining short-term capital market stability or stimulating short-term economic growth in the short term. However, the direct result of China’s bank-directed indirect financing has led to a reduction in monetary policy and even a direct result of interest rate cuts, which may not be directly transmitted to real enterprises in the economy. At the same time, due to multiple factors such as real estate asset price bubbles, RMB exchange rate fluctuations, and Sino-US trade friction, the current room for further stimulus and easing of China’s monetary policy is relatively limited.
Therefore, fiscal policy should and must play a more important role in helping the Chinese economy out of recession. As for how to use fiscal policies to stimulate China’s economic growth potential, a topic that is more controversial lies in the strength of fiscal policy, especially regarding the status of infrastructure investment in the next stage of fiscal policy. Some comments suggested that the government should follow the four trillion stimulus policies in 2008 and protect economic growth through large-scale infrastructure investment. The difference from 2008 is that this investment does not necessarily focus on the traditional infrastructure investment such as “railway infrastructure” (“Tie Gongji”), but rather is based on 5G base station construction, UHV, urban International high-speed railways and urban rail transit, new energy vehicle charging piles, data centers, artificial intelligence and industrial Internet represented by the large-scale investment in the so-called “new infrastructure” field.
However, more and more opinions point out that this kind of so-called “new infrastructure” is not the new infrastructure construction emphasized in the Politburo meeting. It may not be able to make sufficient contributions to the rebound of China’s short-term economic growth rate and high- and medium-term high-quality sustainable development. Such comments point out that, in terms of the so-called “new infrastructure” volume, investment quality, operating efficiency and potential consequences, the so-called “new infrastructure” stimulus not only cannot effectively help the Chinese economy get out of the trough in the short term, but it may Further aggravate the risks and challenges faced by China’s economy in its transformation and upgrading.
On the one hand, with the large amount of investment in infrastructure construction after the “Four Trillion” stimulus in 2008, China has high-speed railways, highways, airports, urban rail transit The infrastructure has not only achieved great progress, but in many areas, even with a per capita levelTo measure, it has also reached the global leading position. Therefore, China’s need for infrastructure has changed significantly compared to the 2008 four trillion stimulus policy.
It is particularly worth noting that due to the long period of investment in infrastructure and the slow results, the cash flow is relatively weak, and also because infrastructure can stimulate economic growth in the short term but Costs are transferred to the future through long-term debt. Therefore, a direct consequence of the four trillion stimulus policy in 2008 was that China ’s debt level has grown significantly and rapidly in the past decade. This rapidly rising debt level has caused many constraints and challenges to the transformation and development of China’s economy in the past, but in the years to come, and even the next stage of China’s healthy, sustainable and high-speed development.
On the other hand, we must realize that the structure of China ’s economy in 2020, compared with the SARS period in 2003 and the financial crisis period in 2008, has undergone significant change. With the increase in household income levels, final consumption has gradually replaced investment among the troika driving China’s economic development, and has become the most important area for promoting China’s economic development. Therefore, whether it is to help China’s economic development in the short or medium and long term, fiscal policy should seem to focus more on promoting and promoting the final consumption of households.
So how can it drive consumption growth? In fact, it is nothing more than two points. The first is to have the willingness of consumers to consume, and the second is to have the ability to consume. The ability to consume is relatively easy to understand, that is, consumers must have sufficient wealth and funds to consume. As a result of the New Coronary Pneumonia epidemic, economic activities slowed significantly and consumption scenes suddenly disappeared. This not only objectively restricted consumption, but also led to a significant deterioration in the company ’s operating conditions. Residents ’income levels stopped increasing and even fell sharply, directly affecting residents’ consumption ability.
And this is why a large number of recent stimulus policies from the central government to local governments are to reduce taxes and burdens and rents by enterprises, postpone the payment of social security, and issue cash to residents The use of consumer coupons guarantees the normal operation of enterprises and the ability of residents and consumers to make the necessary consumption, thereby stabilizing and promoting the stabilization and development of the Chinese economy.
If the consumer ’s consumption decline is simply impacted by short-term income, then the government ’s current tax cuts and the way cash and consumer coupons are issued should be It can drive China’s consumption and macroeconomic stabilization and recovery. However, just as the persistent income hypothesis in macroeconomics (Permanent I