90% of P2P is still dead | domeet webmaster

Sources | New Financial Book (ID: FintechBook)

Author | Thunder

Cover | “I Love My Home”

When the P2P startup boom began in 2014, some people claimed that 90% of the platforms would die, and they were almost ignored as alarmist. This remark is now too conservative.

In the last few days of 2016, in the P2P industry rectification, Hunan Jixian believes that a rare opportunity is coming: the industry is facing adjustment and industry reshuffle, and some P2P will choose to settle in the registered areas of the industry, so it will be heavily invested. Created the Jixian Internet Finance Innovation Center.

After one year, Ganxian County used the preferential policy of “providing supporting office buildings for enterprises in the company, free of charge within three years”, “full registration for registration of enterprises, accounting procedures for financial supervision departments, etc.” Seventy-one P2Ps settled in the media and were referred to by the media as “the first county of P2P”.

It’s only less than a year. Because the policies are unclear, the licenses are not working properly, and some of these platforms have opted out, some have become zombie companies. They will be cancelled after 2017, and now they are not left. 20 are still dying.

Now, the “P2P first county” is going to stay more confusing until October 15, 2019. This day, Hunan has a one-size-fits-all approach to P2P. The P2P services of 24 online lending institutions did not comply with the relevant regulations and were all banned.

Uncertainty policyThe risk, from the county to the provincial to the central, from 2014 to 2018, hit the majority of the P2P entrepreneurial torrent. A similar situation also occurs in the government work report, the high-level policy on Internet finance, 2014 is “to promote the healthy development of Internet finance”, 2015 is “the emergence of Internet finance,” and 2016 is “standard development of Internet finance”, 2017 The year is “highly vigilant against the cumulative risks of Internet finance,” and in 2018 it is “a sound Internet financial regulation.”

In the past 12 years, investors have accompanied the entrepreneurs and financial scammers in a roller coaster ride. If it is not fraudulent, the peninsula is full of land, and the strict supervision of the knife will not be degraded.

The collapse of these platforms has swept the trillions of personal wealth. The financial disaster is so hard to write. Zero-digit data shows that by the end of September, there were only 621 6309 online lending platforms. Each of the more than 5,000 problem platforms is a tragedy.

On October 19th, Shandong issued a P2P “one size fits all” notice, and 28 P2P online loan businesses that failed the acceptance inspection were all banned.

……

Twelve years in a round, clearing the storm has come, please let it end.

One day in early December 2015, several e-lease executives who tried to fly out of the country would not have thought that the “control” of their exit behavior directly became the fuse of the 90 billion yuan e-lease scam collapse. The outbreak of the e-rental incident triggered a continuous crackdown on the illegal offline financial platform. Later, the Pan-Asian incident, the Sino-Jin incident, and the fast deer incident broke out.

“Assessment” nude swimming, probably starting from economic downturn and financial deleveraging, is similar to the P2P credit intermediation model. In the past 12 years, P2P has been under the credit card and rigid redemption business model. The secondary assets originally screened by the banking financial institutions have been ported to the Internet, while P2P has insufficient risk control and lack of credit information. The risk is seriously skewed towards the debt side.

When the big policy of de-leveraging was issued, P2P began to scale down and the stocks began to fall, and large-scale growth was curbed. The consequences came, and most of the platforms collapsed and died.

At the beginning of 2018, Zhang Xiaolei, who holds billions of funds, would not have thought that his side empire would collapse in the opening of several Nanjing properties.

The previous year in NovemberIn Nanjing, there are ten real estates open at the same time, and nearly 3,200 suites are launched. 80% down payment and 7 working days are required. These real estates will instantly draw billions of money in various financial platforms. Qianbao is one of them. One, the money-free redemption of the money treasure network collapsed.

Qianbao.com is a typical example of a pool of funds, rigid redemption, and high-profit storage. It is not surprising that private wealth management has done things for banks, but there is no risk reserve and capital adequacy requirements.

In 2016, the 43.4 billion-scale fast deer system exploded, and the fuse was the box office fraud of the movie “Ip Man 3”.

On March 4th of that year, “Ip Man 3” was officially released in the Mainland, and the box office soared rapidly, 4.7 billion yuan in three days. According to surveys conducted by the regulatory authorities, the “fair question 3” false box office was 32 million yuan, and the self-purchasing box office was 56 million yuan.

The box office fraud is nothing more. Shi Jianxiang, who is good at capital operation, “has not been amazed by the fact that he is dead,” and he has put on the guise of “film + P2P” and the securitization of movie box office assets. The Fast Deer Group used the copyright proceeds packaged by “Ip Man 3” as the target, and repeated financing through more than a dozen P2P platforms. After the “box office shady” was exposed, it triggered an investor run and eventually caused a crash.

The ridiculous thing often has a strange effect.

In SMEs, the quality of assets under de-leverage has affected the financial sector. After the public exchange of private debt assets and the P2P peddling model on the gold exchange for several years, at the end of 2016, Ant Financial Services stepped on the money. Qiao Xing 1.146 billion yuan of private debt defaults. After stepping on the Leijin Exchange, Zhaocaibao broke off with financial assets such as the Gold Exchange, went to the platform, and only did business with the banks.

In July 2019, four months after the announcement of a virtuous exit, Hongling Ventures attempted to give a 30% discount to the purchase of a small lender’s claim. The investor had two options, or lost 30% of the book. Gold and interest, “get off the train” in advance; or pay for three years instalment, perhaps get all the money back.

The platform for doing this kind of shameless thing has gone, there are 50% off acquisitions, and there are 2% off acquisitions. They used to endorse their credits and rigidly pay them. After they have not paid the money, they have to make huge profits and forcibly harvest.

Digging a pit is almost a ghost, and the harvest is almost demon.

Either the scam maker’s e-rentalDing Ning, Deer Deer Shi Jianxiang, or Zhang Xiaolei of Qianbao.com, regardless of the entrepreneurs’ losers’ Dai Zhikang and Pioneer Group Zhang Zhenxin, they are the makers of this defeat.

I have tried to argue that the worst result of the P2P network loan is that Dai Zhikang and Zhang Zhenxin, who were born in the finance department, made online loans and finally got stuck.

They are in the regulatory market, aiming at the arbitrage gap, and are not willing to be regulated by the FinTech or TechFin role, entering the market, they do not want to bear the capital adequacy rate, but do not want to bear the high cost of various risk preparation and provisioning. .

A year ago, I counted eight well-known mine-throwing platforms from 2015 to 2018, resulting in losses of up to 133.7 billion yuan, involving 1.267 million investors (count repeat investors).

In the P2P world, there is no shortage of people to raise the banner of inclusive finance, and to engage in “financial pools” and black-box operations.

In this pseudo-innovation field, there is never a shortage of “e-rental treasures” second, third, fourth…

Table: The number of eight well-known explosive mine platforms involved in 2015-2018 involves the amount and number of investors

In these financial tragedies, the pits are not limited to Ding Ning, Shi Jianxiang, Zhang Xiaolei, and Lang Xianping, Zhang Tielin, and Song Hongbing who speak or stand for the P2P platform.

When the P2P online loan was raised, there were technical companies selling thousands of “P2P systems” a year, but the latter’s running and losing links have nothing to do with their merits.

When cash loans are rampant, there are hundreds of “cash loan” platform systems sold by technology companies in a year. The harvest and huge profits behind this are only in their private interests.

Tragedy occursAt the time, only one or a few people in the back pot, hundreds of thousands of painful investors, and those who eat meat and meat, have already gone.

In 2000, Li Xianglin, an actuary from rural China who worked at JPMorgan Chase, explained in his paper “On the relevance of default: the method of dependency function” that the standard Gaussian connection was introduced with the help of actuarial and heartbreak effects. Span class=”text-remarks” label=”remarks”>(Gaussian copula) curve, proposed by credit default swap (CDS) is used as the basis for judging the relevance of default.

This theory was considered by the industry at the time to solve the most difficult “default-related” problem at Wall Street. In the last ten years, Li Xianglin was called by the media as “the actuary who destroyed Wall Street.”

The elites on Wall Street, based on his formula, figure out a company without knowing any information about the company (lender) (lender)Breach of contract for another company(lender) The impact.

Next, the CDS and CDO markets skyrocketed, sub-assets were rampant, and the US subprime mortgage crisis broke out in 2008.

In China, the P2P roller coaster road is more like a local version of the subprime mortgage crisis.

P2P is an innovation of borrowing convenience, but it does not solve the risk of the investment side, nor does it weaken the risk nature of the asset side.

In China, after the P2P goes online, it is usually the debt side that can expand in size, the asset side still maintains its risk nature, and lacks credit conditions and risk control effectiveness. At this time, bad debts are generated and accumulated, and the P2P platform Transfer of bad debts to new investors through means such as automatic bidding.

P2P platform can only expand with more sub-assets due to the lack of quality assets to offset bad debts and badZhang, to balance the imbalance of the debt side.

This is a vicious circle. Most P2Ps can’t scale down, and they die when they fall.

When the “double down” knife was cut in August 2017, more than 1,800 platforms have been dead in 2 years.

Therefore, when a large number of P2P accumulates the risk of uncertainty, the premise of filing supervision must be to clean up and then file the case.

The small shovel that eliminates the risk will not stop.

Starting in 2016, the industry has set off a big criticism of the P2P business model.

“P2P is the most stupid person to lend money to the group with the worst credit.” The former director of the Technical Supervision Department of the Information Center of the China Securities Regulatory Commission said that he was strong. Chu Zhuang believes that P2P online lending is not Internet finance at all. It is only an extension of the usury model on the Internet. P2P is less efficient than financial institutions, but interest rates are high.

In the past few years, most P2P platforms have been the actual non-deposit lending organizations and the de facto small lenders.

Before 2016, because of the prevalence of the fund pool model, most online lending platforms do the work of credit intermediaries, and there is actually a small network lending role.

From the experience point of view, if P2P is purely information intermediary, investors will die very badly in the sauce tank of secondary assets. The reality of the line of credit intermediation is the true portrayal of the industry in the past 12 years, and the result is even worse.

One of the biggest problems in the P2P industry is that it does not address the sustainability of business models. In the investment side, investors have poor risk tolerance, poor risk identification, and high returns, but they are unable to withstand high risks. On the asset side, the secondary assets are rampant, the short-term credit is obvious, and the risk control is almost ineffective. On the platform side, the profit is on the platform, and the loss belongs to the investor. These three have loopholes that are obviously impossible to fill.

A major problem still exists in China’s P2P industry is the lack of a risk mitigation mechanism. Once the industry thunders, huge property losses will lead investors to the streets.

This risk mitigation mechanism did not appear until the end of 2018 in the P2P online loan filing work plan. The supervision puts an investment limit of 200,000 yuan on investors. The most obvious logic is to solve P2P.The “stakeholder” nature of risk.

With this model is a very poor user experience, difficult to grab the target and serious financial standing.

However, in the case that institutional funds have become an industry trend, institutional funds will enter the market, and ordinary investors will leave, which will promote a wave of investment migration.

After more than a decade of institutional funding in China’s P2P teacher Lending Club, Chinese P2P entrepreneurs understand the benefits of this business model. The transformation has helped to make loans, and the abandonment of P2P has become a trend.

Reviewing, in 2014, there were entrepreneurs who claimed that 90% of P2P platforms will die, almost being scorned as alarmist. Today, this statement is too conservative. As of the end of September this year, the 6,309 P2P platforms that have appeared have only 621 stock platforms to survive and die, and the death rate has reached 90.1%.

And the data is on the way to 99% mortality.